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on an earlier draft of this article. The views expressed herein belong solely to the author.
1. United States Court of Appeals for the 11th Cir., Gen. Order No. 41 (Dec. 30,
2013) (indicating that under 28 U.S.C. § 46(b) the chief judge was certifying “that there is
an emergency requiring that some cases and controversies before this Court be heard by
three-judge panels consisting of fewer than two judges of this Court”) [hereinafter General
Order 41]. A copy of General Order 41 is available at http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/sites/
default/files/courtdocs/clk/GeneralOrder41.pdf.
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At the end of 2013, the chief judge of the Eleventh Circuit
declared a state of emergency, exempting the court from the
requirement in 28 U.S.C. §46(b) that each of its panels include a
majority of Eleventh Circuit judges.1 As would later become
clear, the emergency arose from multiple vacancies on the court,
which exacerbated the effect of its heavy per-judge caseload.
Throughout 2014, emergency panels consisting of one Eleventh
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2. Appellant’s Pet. for Reh’g, United States v. Rodriguez, No. 12-14629, at 8–14
(11th Cir. Mar. 25, 2014) [hereinafter Rodriguez Petition]. The Eleventh Circuit’s initial
panel decision appears at United States v. Rodriguez, 557 F. App’x 930 (11th Cir. 2014),
cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 135 S. Ct. 390 (2014).
3. United States v. Rodriguez, 753 F.3d 1206, 1207 (11th Cir. 2014) (denying
rehearing and holding that “General Order No. 41 declares an emergency clearly
contemplated by Congress”).
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Circuit judge and two visiting judges resolved over one hundred
appeals.
In a petition for rehearing filed in one such case, an
unsuccessful appellant challenged the validity of the emergency
panel.2 Rather than resolving the petition summarily, the
emergency panel instead published a precedential opinion
upholding the certified emergency.3 Although other circuits have
certified section 46(b) emergencies based on the vacancycaseload combination, the Eleventh Circuit’s opinion is the first
federal appellate decision addressing a challenge to such an
emergency. Because extended vacancies and heavy caseloads
are likely to persist, that opinion invites new scrutiny of the
emergency exception to section 46(b)’s majority requirement.
This article begins that undertaking.
Part II provides the broader context for discussion and
analysis of this important issue. It summarizes the heavy,
vacancy-exacerbated caseloads facing the federal courts of
appeals, and their use of visiting judges as one tool to help
manage those caseloads. It details the limitations that Congress
has placed on the use of visiting judges, focusing on section
46(b)’s requirement that a majority of the panel be drawn from
the presiding court, as well as the statutory exceptions to that
requirement. And it briefly recounts prior instances in which
circuits have invoked the statute’s emergency exception based
on extended vacancies and heavy caseloads.
Part III summarizes the dismal conditions in the Eleventh
Circuit—four vacancies out of twelve authorized judgeships and
the highest per-judge caseload of all the circuits—that
understandably led it to declare an emergency in General Order
41. It then summarizes General Order 41, the emergency panels
operating under it, Rodriguez’s challenge to the validity of one
such panel, and the Rodriguez opinion.
Part IV analyzes the central statutory issue—namely,
whether multiple vacancies and a heavy caseload may constitute
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an emergency within the meaning of section 46(b)’s exception—
and concludes that the statutory issue is more complicated than
suggested by the sparse analytical treatment it has received thus
far.
Part V concludes the article by defending the courts’ broad
interpretation of section 46(b)’s emergency exception. It
nonetheless summarizes the concerns about the use of visiting
judges and recasts the balance that Congress must ultimately
maintain between difficult competing considerations. It predicts
that, in this era of extended vacancies and heavy caseloads, the
federal courts of appeals, now armed with a tested precedent in
Rodriguez, are likely to continue certifying section 46(b)
emergencies. It therefore recommends that this practice receive
additional scrutiny in the context of the vacancy and caseload
crises facing the federal courts of appeals.
II. THE BROADER CONTEXT

05/20/2015 10:47:31

4. See, e.g., Marin K. Levy, The Mechanics of Federal Appeals: Uniformity and Case
Management in the Circuit Courts, 61 DUKE L.J. 315, 321 (2011) (“By the 1970s, the
phrase ‘crisis in volume’ was coined to describe the workload of the courts of appeals.”).
5. Marin K. Levy, Judicial Attention as a Scarce Resource: A Preliminary Defense of
How Judges Allocate Time across Cases in the Federal Courts of Appeals, 81 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 401, 402–03, 405 n.19, 407–09 (2013).
6. Levy, supra note 4, at 324 n.44 (citation omitted).
7. Levy, supra note 5, at 407–08 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
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The federal courts of appeals have long faced a “crisis in
volume.”4 Annual filings per circuit judge have mushroomed
over the last sixty years—from seventy-three in 1950, to
seventy-seven in 1964, to 137 in 1978, to 194 in 1984, to 237 in
1990, to 300 in 1997, to nearly 370 in 2008, and then
approximately 330 in 2013.5 “Strikingly, per-judge filings have
more than quadrupled even as the number of regional courts of
appeals judges has more than doubled—from 75 in 1950 . . . to
167 in 2010.”6 “This surge has been attributed largely to a flurry
of congressional activity in the 1960s, which led to new federal
rights and mechanisms for obtaining them.”7
Extended judicial vacancies exacerbate the crisis of
volume, and such vacancies have become commonplace in
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recent years.8 For example, in the first five years of the Obama
administration, the average time between vacancy and
nomination for circuit judges was 310 days, and the average
time between nomination and confirmation was 253 days.9 In
the most extreme cases, some circuit vacancies, including the
D.C. Circuit seat that became vacant upon John G. Roberts’s
elevation to Chief Justice,10 have lasted for over eight years.11
For every vacant seat, there is a stack of appeals that must be redistributed to judges who have already been confirmed;12 and
the longer the vacancy, the higher the stack. This increase in
per-judge caseload predictably leads to delays, backlogs, and
even sub-optimal work product. The administration of appellate
justice suffers.13
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8. See Carl Tobias, Senate Gridlock and Federal Judicial Selection, 88 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 2233, 2234–38 (2013) (summarizing the history of extended circuit vacancies).
9. Russell Wheeler, Judicial Nominations and Confirmations: Fact and Fiction,
FixGov: Making Government Work (Dec. 30, 2013, 10:33 a.m.), http://www.brookings.edu
/blogs/fixgov/posts/2013/12/30-staffing-federal-judiciary-2013-no-breakthrough-year (including
tables 5 and 11, which show the average number of days from vacancy to nomination and
the average number of days from nomination through hearing to confirmation in the
Clinton, G.W. Bush, and Obama administrations) (accessed Feb. 2, 2015; copy on file with
Journal of Appellate Practice and Process).
10. Administrative Office of the United States Courts, Archive of Judicial Vacancies,
Vacancy List as of Dec. 1, 2013, http://www.uscourts.gov/JudgesAndJudgeships/Judicial
Vacancies/ArchiveOfJudicialVacancies.aspx (accessed Feb. 4, 2015; copy on file with
Journal of Appellate Practice and Process).
11. See Andrew L. Adler, Eight Years and Counting: The Longest Current Judicial
Vacancy and the Political Dynamic that Produced It, 97 JUDICATURE 125 (Nov./Dec.
2013) (discussing the circumstances surrounding two such vacancies).
12. See Carl Tobias, Filling the District of Arizona Vacancies, 56 ARIZ. L. REV. SYL. 5,
6 (2014) (pointing out that “[t]he vacancy crisis places additional pressure on sitting
judges”). The article is available at http://www.arizonalawreview.org/2014/syllabus/tobias;
clicking “view PDF” at the bottom of the page on which it appears links to a copy bearing
page numbers.
13. See, e.g., Thomas E. Baker, Applied Freakonomics: Explaining the “Crisis of
Volume”, 8 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 101, 114 (2006) (opining that, in response to the socalled crisis of volume, “we now take for granted what were once characterized as
‘emergency’ procedures,” that “[w]e have lowered our expectations for appellate
procedure,” that “[w]e have defined down our appellate values,” and that “[w]e all have
internalized the postmodern norms of the minimalist procedural paradigm”); William M.
Richman, An Argument on the Record for More Federal Judgeships, 1 J. APP. PRAC. &
PROCESS 37, 38 (1999) (opining that, as a consequence of the caseload crisis, “the overall
quality of the work of the circuit courts has declined markedly,” the concomitant casemanagement techniques have created a system consisting of two “different tracks of justice
for different cases and different litigants,” and the “reductions in oral argument deprive[d]
litigants of the assurance that the judges have paid some personal attention to their cases”).
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To ameliorate their heavy caseload, courts of appeals have
employed controversial case-management techniques that
include, for instance, granting oral argument in fewer cases,
publishing fewer precedential opinions, and delegating increased
responsibility to law clerks and staff attorneys.14 “Despite these
innovations, the regional courts of appeals continue to operate
under stress because filings have, for the most part, continued to
rise.”15 And the stress persists despite the commendable
contribution of senior judges, who have “little or no financial
incentive” to “continue working well after they have reached the
retirement age of most Americans.”16 While some “have called
for changes to the courts’ constraints—an increase in the
numbers of judges or a decrease in the number of cases,” neither
proposal “has gained political traction in the decades since they
were first proposed.”17
It is therefore unsurprising that federal courts of appeals
have also taken advantage of one option that Congress has long
afforded them: visiting judges.18 To manage their heavy
caseloads,19 many federal courts of appeals regularly use visiting
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14. See, e.g., Marin K. Levy, Judging Justice on Appeal, 123 YALE L.J. 2386, 2393–
2402 (2014) (reviewing William M. Richman & William L. Reynolds, INJUSTICE ON
APPEAL: THE UNITED STATES COURTS OF APPEALS IN CRISIS (Oxford Univ. Press 2013)).
15. Levy, supra note 4, at 324.
16. David R. Stras & Ryan W. Scott, Are Senior Judges Unconstitutional? 92
CORNELL L. REV. 453, 455 (2007) (“Without senior judges, some appellate courts would
face a disastrous build-up of backlogs, severe problems administering justice in a timely
fashion, or even a total breakdown in the trial of civil cases. Senior judges are
indispensable, essential, inestimable, invaluable.”) (internal quotation marks, brackets, and
citations omitted).
17. Levy, supra note 5, at 404; see Baker, supra note 13, at 112–13 (summarizing prior
structural proposals to the federal appellate courts, and explaining that “more recently there
seems to be no interest in them whatsoever on the part of the judges or the Congress, the
officials with the power to implement them. . . . The powers-that-be apparently have opted
for retaining the present structure, at least for the indefinite future.”).
18. See Jeffrey Budziak, Fungible Justice: The Use of Visiting Judges in the United
States Courts of Appeals, at 11–15 (2011) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Ohio State
University) (tracing the history of visiting judges back to the mid-nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries), available at https://etd.ohiolink.edu/ap/10?0::NO:10:P10_ACCESSION
_NUM:osu1312564916 (accessed Feb. 3, 2015; copy on file with Journal of Appellate
Practice and Process).
19. See Administrative Office of the United States Courts, 2011 Annual Report of the
Director, Support to Judges, Visiting Judges, http://www.uscourts.gov/annualreport_2011
/Support_To_Judges.aspx (“The Judiciary uses intercircuit and intracircuit assignments of
Article III judges to provide short-term assistance to courts with overwhelming
caseloads.”); Richard B. Saphire & Michael E. Solimine, Diluting Justice on Appeal?: An
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judges from other Article III courts, who temporarily sit by
designation.20 Each year from 1997 to 2013, at least 300—and
sometimes more than 400—different visiting judges have
annually participated in approximately 3,700 to 5,400 appeals
terminated on the merits, representing from approximately four
to almost seven percent of all such appeals.21 While this practice
is not without potential inefficiencies,22 visiting judges help
relieve the pressure created by heavy caseloads. It has been
reported, for example, that the consequences for one busy
appellate court would have been “catastrophic were designated

36524-aap_15-2 Sheet No. 14 Side B
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Examination of the Use of District Court Judges Sitting by Designation on the United
States Courts of Appeals, 28 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 351, 362–63 (1995) (“Virtually all of the
circuits . . . stated or implied that district judges were being used routinely to deal with
heavy appellate work caused by numerous appeals or by unfilled vacancies.”).
20. See, e.g., Budziak, supra note 18, at 21 (table showing use of visiting judges among
regional circuits from 1997 to 2010). One notable exception is the D.C. Circuit, which
rarely uses visiting judges. Levy, supra note 4, at 384 n.414; James J. Brudney & Corey
Distlear, Designated Diffidence: District Court Judges on the Courts of Appeals, 35 L. &
SOC’Y REV. 565, 575 n.15 (2001).
21. The statistics mentioned in this sentence were derived by the author from official
federal-courts data for the years 1997 through 2013. See, e.g., Administrative Office of the
United States Courts, Judicial Business 2013, Table V-2, U.S. Courts of Appeals—Services
Provided by Visiting Judges in Appeals Terminated (2013) (compiling statistics for 2013),
Table S-2, U.S. Courts of Appeals—Total Case Participations in Cases Terminated on the
Merits After Oral Hearings or Submission on Briefs (same); see also Budziak, supra note
18, at 19 (figure graphing the number of visiting judges against the number of total appeals
from 1975 to 2010). For statistics on the use of visiting judges in the Ninth Circuit, for
example, see Morgan Christen, Introduction, 43 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 1, 3 (2013)
(“Our circuit also receives considerable help from district judges and judges visiting from
other parts of the country. In the year ending June 30, 2012, these judges participated in
4.9% of the appeals our circuit resolved on the merits.”); Susan P. Graber, Introduction, 42
GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 1, 2 (2011) (“This past year, visiting judges participated in more
than 1,100 cases that were decided on the merits.”); Marsha S. Berzon, Introduction, 41
GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 287, 287 n.1 (2011) (noting that the Ninth Circuit “had 185
visiting judges—district judges from the Ninth Circuit and district and circuit judges from
elsewhere—helping us out by sitting on panels” in 2010).
22. See, e.g., Administrative Office of the United States Courts, Committee Answers
Courts’ Calls for Help, THIRD BRANCH, Dec. 2010, at 10, 10 (noting that Chair of Judicial
Conference Committee on Intercircuit Assignments suggested that, when compared to incircuit visiting judges, out-of-circuit visiting judges may not know the law of the circuit,
may not know the quality of the work of the assigned judge, and may incur greater travel
costs); Sara C. Benesh, The Contribution of “Extra” Judges, 48 ARIZ. L. REV. 301, 302–03
(2006) (summarizing inefficiencies with regard to visiting district judges—namely, they
may be unfamiliar with appellate practice and the operation of the federal courts of
appeals; they often require assistance; their top priority remains their busy docket back
home, leading to delays in turn-around time; and they are often assigned lighter cases while
the circuit judges on the panel are assigned the more difficult cases).
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23. Benesh, supra note 22, at 304 (quotation marks and citations omitted).
24. Cf. Glidden v. Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 604 (1962) (Douglas, J., dissenting)
(“My view is that we subtly undermine the constitutional system when we treat federal
judges as fungible.”).
25. 28 U.S.C. § 291(a).
26. Id. § 292(a).
27. Id. § 292(d).
28. Pub. L. No. 97-164, § 103(b)(2), 96 Stat. 25, 25–26 (1982) (providing that “at least
a majority” of the judges sitting on a panel in a federal court of appeals “shall be judges of
that court, unless such judges cannot sit because recused or disqualified, or unless the chief
judge of that court certifies that there is an emergency”).
29. S. Rep. No. 97-275, at 26, reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 11, 36 [hereinafter 1982
Senate Report].

36524-aap_15-2 Sheet No. 15 Side A

judges not available to sit,” and one circuit judge has remarked
that his court “could not have functioned without” visiting
district judges.23
Nonetheless, visiting judges are not a panacea, and
Congress has prescribed procedures and standards that must be
followed before visiting judges may be designated to sit
temporarily on the federal courts of appeals. These procedures
and standards vary based on the status of the visiting judge,
reflecting the fact that Congress has carefully considered the use
of visiting judges and does not regard federal judges as fully
fungible.24 First, the Chief Justice may, “in the public interest,”
designate out-of-circuit circuit judges “upon request by the chief
judge or circuit justice” for that circuit.25 Second, the Chief
Judge of the circuit may designate in-circuit district judges
“whenever the business of that court so requires.”26 And, third,
the Chief Justice may designate out-of-circuit district judges
“upon presentation of a certification of necessity by the chief
judge or circuit justice of the circuit wherein the need arises.”27
While, in practice, these procedures and standards do not pose
substantial obstacles, they reflect Congress’s unwillingness to
allow the unfettered use of visiting judges.
That unwillingness is most evident in a critical limitation in
the Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982.28 The
accompanying Senate Report observed that, under then-current
law, “a three-judge appellate panel may be composed of any
combination of active, senior, designated, or district court
federal judges.”29 As a result, it was not “infrequent that there
[would] be only one circuit judge on a panel or that the presiding
judge [would] be a senior judge or a judge from another
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circuit.”30 Congress believed that “such situations [would] lead
to doctrinal instability and unpredictability in the law of the
circuit because district court and court of appeals judges from
outside the circuit may not know or may not feel bound by the
law of that circuit.”31 Congress therefore drew the line at one
visiting judge per panel, revising section 46(b) to require that
panels consist of “three judges, at least a majority of whom shall
be judges of that court.”32 Congress believed that, as visiting
judges became more frequently utilized,33 this majority
requirement would “discourage[ ] any unnecessary borrowing of
judges”34 and “provide greater stability and predictability in the
law being applied in any given area of the country.”35 In short,
section 46(b), as amended, reflects a strong Congressional
preference that appellate panels be composed of at least two
judges of the presiding court.
Significantly, however, Congress also codified exceptions
in two “unless” clauses. Specifically, section 46(b) provides that
appeals may be resolved by
panels, each consisting of three judges, at least a majority
of whom shall be judges of that court, unless such judges
cannot sit because recused or disqualified, or unless the
chief judge of that court certifies that there is an emergency
including, but not limited to, the unavailability of a judge of
36
the court because of illness.

05/20/2015 10:47:31

30. Id. at 9, reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 19.
31. Id.
32. 28 U.S.C. § 46(b).
33. 1982 Senate Report, supra note 29, at 9, reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 19
(acknowledging that “a substantial number of judges from outside the circuit sit[ ] by
designation” and that “district judges sit[ ] regularly on the courts of appeals”).
34. Id.
35. Id. at 26, reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N at 36; see In re Bongiorno, 694 F.2d 917,
918 n.1 (2d Cir. 1982) (“Congress’s purpose in enacting [§ 46(b)] was to prevent the
instability and unpredictability in the law of a circuit that could result if many panels were
composed principally of judges from ‘outside’ the circuit.”) (citations omitted).
36. 28 U.S.C. § 46(b) (emphasis added).
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Thus, Congress included one exception for recusals or
disqualifications, and one for emergencies. For present purposes,
the key statutory issue is whether the emergency exception—“an
emergency including, but not limited to, the unavailability of a
judge of the court because of illness”—encompasses situations
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in which extended vacancies exacerbate the burden that a court’s
heavy caseload poses for the other judges.
At least a handful of courts of appeals have resolved that
issue affirmatively, certifying an emergency under section 46(b)
based on the vacancy-caseload combination. For example, the
Fifth Circuit has done so at least twice, once in 1991 and again
in 1999. In each case, the chief judge’s certification order
described the court’s heavy caseload, the number of vacancies,
and the uncertain status of filling those vacancies.37 Notably, in
the 1991 order, Chief Judge Charles Clark criticized the
executive for failing to make nominations to fill the vacancies,
despite the court’s pleas for help.38
Other courts have also certified section 46(b) emergencies
based on vacancies and caseload. For example, the Second
Circuit certified a section 46(b) emergency in 1998 “when five
out of thirteen judicial positions on the circuit had become
vacant—and were left unfilled by a Senate hostile to the
President’s nominees.”39 That court ultimately resolved over
fifty appeals with emergency panels.40 The Tenth Circuit
reportedly certified a section 46(b) emergency based on
vacancies and caseload in 1994.41 And, as mentioned at the
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37. See Order Declaring an Emergency Under 28 U.S.C. § 46(b) (5th Cir. Sept. 28,
1999) (Carolyn Dineen King, C.J.) (“In sum, the three judicial vacancies, the injury to an
active judge and the sustained high level of case filings have created a judicial emergency
in the court.”); Order Declaring an Emergency under 28 U.S.C. § 46(b) (5th Cir. Oct. 28,
1991) (Charles Clark, C.J.) (“This court is authorized to have 17 judges in regular active
service. Today, the number of judges so serving is 13. Only one nomination has been sent
to the Senate for its advice and consent. It is now pending in the Senate. The circuit is
experiencing increases in appellate filings greater than those experienced in any other
United States court of appeals.”) [hereinafter Clark Emergency Order].
38. Clark Emergency Order, supra note 37; see also A. Leo Levin, Beyond Techniques
of Case Management: The Challenge of the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, 67 ST.
JOHN’S L. REV. 877, 883 n.36 (1993) (quoting Clark Emergency Order and, echoing
Congress’s concern underlying the majority requirement, noting that panels composed of
multiple visiting judges would have a “significant impact on the precedential value of the
decisions rendered as well as on litigant satisfaction”).
39. Bert I. Huang, Lightened Scrutiny, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1109, 1126 (2011).
40. These cases are identifiable by an asterisk footnote. See, e.g., United States v.
Truscello, 168 F.3d 61, 62 n.*** (2d Cir. 1999) (“Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 46(b) and an
order of the Chief Judge of this Court certifying a judicial emergency, this case was heard
by an emergency panel consisting of one judge from this Court and two judges from the
United States District Court sitting by designation.”).
41. Gordon Bermant, Jeffrey A. Hennemuth & A. Fletcher Mangum, Judicial
Vacancies: An Examination of the Problem and Possible Solutions, 14 MISS. C. L. REV.
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beginning of this article, the Eleventh Circuit recently did so in
General Order 41.42
Thus, several circuits have, understandably, taken the
position that judicial vacancies and a heavy caseload can give
rise to an emergency for purposes of section 46(b). That position
is reinforced by the Administrative Office of the United States
Courts, which compiles a list of vacancies that it considers
“judicial emergencies” in urgent need of filling.43 For the federal
courts of appeals, it determines judicial emergencies based on
the duration of vacancies and the number of filings per panel in
a circuit, with the weight of filings adjusted based on the type of
case.44 While these judicial emergencies have no legal
relationship to section 46(b), they indicate that the federal
judiciary, as an institution,45 believes that extended vacancies
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319, 319 n.2 (1994) (noting that the Tenth Circuit declared an emergency under § 46(b)
“because of persistent vacancies and increasing workload,” citing Chief Judge’s Order
Declaring an Emergency under 28 U.S.C. § 46(b) (10th Cir. Mar. 29, 1994)).
42. Other examples may exist, but unfortunately they are difficult to identify. With the
exception of General Order 41, emergency certification orders are generally not available
on courts’ websites or legal databases, and opinions issued in cases decided by irregular
panels often do not explain the reason for their composition. For example, the Eighth
Circuit certified a section 46(b) emergency in 2000, resolving at least seventeen appeals
with emergency panels, but the opinions did not specify the nature of the emergency. See,
e.g., United States v. Gallardo-Marquez, 253 F.3d 1121, 1122 n.3 (8th Cir. 2001)
(“Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 46(b), the Chief Judge certified the existence of a judicial
emergency necessitating the designation of a panel consisting of fewer than two members
of the Court of Appeals.”). The Fourth Circuit resolved at least fifteen cases with panels
consisting of two visiting judges from 1990 to 1994, but the opinions did not reference
section 46(b). See Saphire & Solimine, supra note 19, at 382 & n.134 (citing cases). And
the same is true of at least one Eleventh Circuit case decided before General Order 41. See
Gulf Power Co. v. FCC, 226 F.3d 1220, 1223 (11th Cir. 2000) (Carnes, J., concerning the
denial of rehearing en banc) (citing Parris v. The Miami Herald Publ’g Co., 216 F.3d
1298, 1299 (11th Cir. 2000)).
43. United States Courts, Judges & Judgeships, Judicial Vacancies, Judicial Emergencies,
http://www.uscourts.gov/JudgesAndJudgeships/JudicialVacancies/JudicialEmergencies.aspx
(characterizing thirteen vacancies, one of which had existed for 3,322 days as of early
February 2015, as judicial emergencies) (accessed Feb. 4, 2015; copy on file with Journal
of Appellate Practice and Process).
44. See id. (defining “judicial emergency” for federal courts of appeals as “any vacancy
in a court of appeals where adjusted filings per panel are in excess of 700; or any vacancy
in existence more than 18 months where adjusted filings are between 500 to 700 per
panel”); see also Arthur D. Hellman, Assessing Judgeship Needs in the Federal Courts of
Appeals: Policy Choices and Process Concerns, 5 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 239, 244–52
(2003) (discussing the adjusted-filing metric in the context of requests for additional
judgeships).
45. The Administrative Office of the United States Courts operates under the
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and a heavy caseload can give rise to an “emergency.”
More surprising is that section 46(b) emergency
certifications went unchallenged in court.46 Indeed, emergency
panels have resolved numerous appeals over the years, which
likely produced dissatisfied litigants, and there have been
challenges to the composition of other irregular panels in the
past.47 While some of those challenges involved section 46(b)
and related issues, none challenged the certification of a section
46(b) emergency, let alone one based on the vacancy-caseload
combination. The Eleventh Circuit recently confronted and
addressed the first such challenge.
III. THE DISMAL CONDITIONS IN THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT,
GENERAL ORDER NO. 41, AND THE RODRIGUEZ CASE
A. Conditions in the Eleventh Circuit
At the time the Eleventh Circuit split off from the Fifth
Circuit in 1981, it “was a court of twelve judges and 2,556

36524-aap_15-2 Sheet No. 17 Side A
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“supervision and direction of the Judicial Conference of the United States,” 28 U.S.C. §
604(a), which is charged with, inter alia, “mak[ing] a comprehensive survey of the
condition of business in the courts of the United States and prepar[ing] plans for
assignment of judges to or from circuits or districts where necessary.” 28 U.S.C. § 331.
46. Or, at least, any such challenges went unaddressed by the courts and thus went
unreported.
47. See, e.g., Nguyen v. United States, 539 U.S. 69 (2003) (holding that a Ninth Circuit
panel consisting of two Article III judges and one Article IV judge lacked authority to
decide petitioners’ appeals); United States v. Desimone, 140 F.3d 457 (2d Cir. 1998)
(concluding that the majority requirement of § 46(b) was not violated when a circuit judge
on a panel died after oral argument, and the decision was rendered by one circuit judge and
one visiting judge); Murray v. Nat’l Broadcasting Co., Inc., 35 F.3d 45, 46 (2d Cir. 1994)
(concluding that a “case may be validly adjudicated by a panel of two circuit judges under
circumstances where one of the three judges originally assigned to hear the appeal recused
himself immediately before oral argument”); Cone Corp. v. Hillsborough Cnty., 995 F.2d
185, 185–86 (11th Cir. 1993) (en banc) (holding that a senior judge was a “judge of that
court” for purposes of § 46(b)’s majority requirement); United States v. Claiborne, 870
F.2d 1463, 1466–67 (9th Cir. 1989) (rejecting argument that chief judge of the Ninth
Circuit should have polled the other circuit judges of the Ninth Circuit before certifying the
need for out-of-circuit circuit judges under 28 U.S.C. § 291(a)); Bongiorno, 694 F.2d at
918 n.1 (concluding, sua sponte, that senior judges constituted “judges of that court” for
purposes of § 46(b)’s majority requirement); Bessemer & Lake Erie R. Co. v. I.C.C., 691
F.2d 1104, 1117 (3d Cir. 1982) (upholding the validity of a panel composed of one active
circuit judge and two district judges, because all of the other circuit judges had disqualified
themselves or were otherwise ineligible to hear the case).
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filings.”48 From 2012 to 2014, over thirty years later, filings
ranged from approximately 6,000 to almost 6,500, ranking it
third among the circuits in total appeals filed.49 Despite this
substantial increase in volume, the Eleventh Circuit still has only
twelve authorized judgeships. That is by request. In 2003, the
Judicial Conference of the United States submitted
recommendations to Congress for additional circuit judgeships;
based on the adjusted-filing caseload metric used, the Eleventh
Circuit would have been justified in requesting at least ten new
judgeships.50 Seeking to remain as small as possible, however,
the court declined to request a single new judgeship, citing
concerns about the coherence and stability of circuit precedent,
as well as collegiality.51
The result is that the Eleventh Circuit is one of the busiest
federal appellate courts in the country. In 2013, the Eleventh
Circuit had the most total appeals filed and total appeals
terminated when those numbers were divided by the number of
authorized panels.52 Moreover, the Eleventh Circuit issued 325
written opinions per active judge; the next closest circuit issued
only 234, and only one other circuit issued over 200.53 The
Eleventh Circuit terminated 913 actions on the merits per active
judge; the next closest circuit terminated 745, and only one other
circuit terminated more than 700.54 And the Eleventh Circuit
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48. Hellman, supra note 44, at 254.
49. Administrative Office of the United States Courts, Statistics, Federal Judicial
Caseload Statistics, Caseload Statistics 2014, Table B-1 (showing 6,047 new cases
commenced in the Eleventh Circuit); Administrative Office of the United States Courts,
Statistics, Federal Judicial Caseload Statistics, Caseload Statistics 2013, Table B-1
(showing 6,226 new cases commenced in the Eleventh Circuit); Administrative Office of
the United States Courts, Statistics, Federal Judicial Caseload Statistics, Caseload
Statistics 2012, Table B-1 (showing 6,446 new cases commenced in the Eleventh Circuit).
50. Hellman, supra note 44, at 253 & n.49, 255 n.54.
51. Id. at 255; see id. at 254–60 (questioning the Eleventh Circuit’s decision not to
request additional judgeships despite a significant rise in caseload).
52. Administrative Office of the United States Courts, Federal Court Management
Statistics Archive, Appeals Summary Pages, U.S. Court of Appeals Summary—12-Month
Period Ending December 31, 2013 [hereinafter December 2013 Summary]. An electronic
copy of the Summary is available at http://www.uscourts.gov/viewer.aspx?doc=/uscourts/
Statistics/FederalCourtManagementStatistics/2013/appeals-fcms-summary-pages-december
-2013.pdf.
53. Id.
54. Id.
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issued 243 procedural terminations per active judge; the next
closest circuit had 139, and no other circuit had more than 100.55
Similar numbers existed in 2012 and 2011. In 2012, the
Eleventh Circuit was comfortably first in total appeals filed and
total appeals terminated per panel.56 Likewise, the court led the
way with 291 written opinions per active judge and 214
procedural terminations per active judge (more than double the
next circuit); and it was second in terminations on the merits per
active judge.57 In 2011, the Eleventh Circuit again led in total
appeals filed and total appeals terminated per panel.58 And the
court was first in procedural terminations per active judge, and
only slightly trailed the Fourth Circuit in both written opinions
per active judge and terminations on the merits per active
judge.59
Given the historical increase in filings but static number
of judgeships, the Eleventh Circuit can ill afford extended
judicial vacancies. Yet in 2013, the Eleventh Circuit ranked
second among the circuits with 29.2 months as the total number
of months with vacant judgeships.60 In 2012, it ranked fourth
with nineteen months.61 And, in 2011, it again endured 19.1 total
months.62 Because the Eleventh Circuit has one of the highest
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55. Id.
56. Administrative Office of the United States Courts, Federal Court Management
Statistics Archive, Appeals Summary Pages, U.S. Court of Appeals Summary—12-Month
Period Ending December 31, 2012 [hereinafter December 2012 Summary]. An electronic
copy of the Summary is available at http://www.uscourts.gov/viewer.aspx?doc=/uscourts/
Statistics/FederalCourtManagementStatistics/2012/appeals-fcms-summary-pages-december
-2012.pdf.
57. Id.
58. Administrative Office of the United States Courts, Federal Court Management
Statistics Archive, Appeals Summary Pages, U.S. Court of Appeals Summary—12-Month
Period Ending December 31, 2011 [hereinafter December 2011 Summary]. An electronic
copy of the Summary is available at http://www.uscourts.gov/viewer.aspx?doc=/uscourts/
Statistics/FederalCourtManagementStatistics/2011/Appeals _ FCMS _ Summary _ Pages _
December_2011.pdf.
59. Id.
60. See December 2013 Summary, supra note 52, at Explanation of Selected Terms
(providing that “[v]acant judgeship months are the total number of months that vacancies
occurred in any judgeship position in a circuit or district”).
61. December 2012 Summary, supra note 56.
62. December 2011 Summary, supra note 58.
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per-judge caseloads even when all of its judgeships are filled,63
these vacancies greatly exacerbated the difficulties caused by
that heavy caseload.
Four of these vacancies existed as of December 30, 2013,
when the court declared its emergency.64 The first vacancy arose
with the retirement of Judge Stanley F. Birch, Jr., in August
2010.65 The second vacancy arose in July 2012, when Judge J.L.
Edmondson took senior status after serving for over twenty-five
years on the court.66 The third vacancy arose on September 30,
2013, when Judge Rosemary Barkett retired after serving for
nearly twenty years on the court.67 The final vacancy arose on
October 26, 2013, when Judge Joel F. Dubina took senior status
after serving for over twenty years on the court.68 Notably, even
before Judge Barkett announced her retirement,69 Judge Dubina
had selflessly decided to delay taking senior status for several
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63. For example, the court had no vacancies in 2008, yet still had the most appeals filed
and terminated per panel, the most terminations on the merits per judge, and the most
procedural terminations per judge. Administrative Office of the United States Courts,
Federal Court Management Statistics Archive, Appeals Summary Pages, U.S. Court of
Appeals—Judicial Caseload Profile (comparing the circuits). An electronic copy of the
Profile is available at http://www.uscourts.gov/viewer.aspx?doc=/cgi-bin/cmsa2008.pl.
And, in 2002, the court had only one vacancy, yet still had the highest adjusted filings per
panel of any circuit. See Hellman, supra note 44, at 253 (recounting that adjusted filings
per panel were 1,120 in the Eleventh Circuit, whereas that figure ranged from 583 to 870
for four circuits requesting additional judgeships).
64. There was another vacancy on the court from February 2011, when Judge Susan H.
Black took senior status, to February 2012, when Judge Adalberto J. Jordan was confirmed
to fill the vacancy. Federal Judicial Center, Biographical Directory of Federal Judges,
http://www.fjc.gov/history/home.nsf/page/judges.html (type “Jordan” in search box, click
“Go,” then click “Jordan, Adalberto Jose”) (indicating that Judge Jordan was nominated on
August 2, 2012, and commissioned on February 17, 2012); id. (type “Black” in search box,
click “Go,” then click “Black, Susan Harrell”) (indicating that Judge Black took senior
status on February 25, 2011) (both accessed Feb. 6, 2015; copies on file with Journal of
Appellate Practice and Process).
65. Id. (type “Birch” in search box, click “Go,” then click “Birch, Stanley F. Jr.”)
(accessed Feb. 6, 2015; copy on file with Journal of Appellate Practice and Process).
66. Id. (type “Edmondson” in search box, click “Go,” then click “Edmondson, James
Larry”) (accessed Feb. 6, 2015; copy on file with Journal of Appellate Practice and
Process).
67. Id. (type “Barkett” in search box, click “Go,” then click “Barkett, Rosemary”)
(accessed Feb. 6, 2015; copy on file with Journal of Appellate Practice and Process).
68. Id. (type “Dubina” in search box, click “Go,” then click “Dubina, Joel Fredrick”)
(accessed Feb. 6, 2015; copy on file with Journal of Appellate Practice and Process).
69. Bill Rankin, Barkett to Leave Appeals Court, Atlanta J.-Constitution, Aug. 19,
2013, at 5B.
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months due to the court’s pending vacancies and heavy
caseload,70 explaining that “[l]eaving the Court with three
vacancies is just an intolerable situation for my colleagues.”71
In sum: Filings have more than doubled in the Eleventh
Circuit since its creation; the number of authorized judgeships
has nonetheless remained the same; four of the court’s twelve
authorized judgeships were vacant at the time of the certified
emergency; one seat had been vacant for over three years, and
another seat had been vacant for well over a year; the
Administrative Office of the United States Courts considered all
four vacancies judicial emergencies;72 and the Eleventh Circuit
led the circuits in per-judge caseload in 2013. If extended
vacancies and a heavy per-judge caseload can constitute an
emergency within the meaning of section 46(b), then it would be
difficult to dispute that the conditions in the Eleventh Circuit
rose to that level in late 2013.
B. General Order 41
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70. Bill Rankin, Chief Judge May Wait before Taking Senior Status, AJC.com (Feb. 4,
2013, 6:31 p.m.), http://www.ajc.com/news/news/local/chief-judge-may-wait-before-taking
-senior-status/nWFtj/ (accessed Feb. 6, 2015; copy on file with Journal of Appellate
Practice and Process).
71. Id.
72. Administrative Office of the United States Courts, Archive of Judicial Vacancies,
Judicial Emergencies as of Dec. 1, 2013, http://www.uscourts.gov/JudgesAndJudgeships/
JudicialVacancies/ArchiveOfJudicialVacancies.aspx (accessed Feb. 9, 2015; copy on file
with Journal of Appellate Practice and Process).
73. General Order 41, supra note 1.
74. Id. at 2.
75. Id. at 1.
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On December 30, 2013, about two months after the fourth
vacancy arose, the Eleventh Circuit issued General Order 41.73
Writing “for the Court,”74 Chief Judge Carnes, after quoting the
relevant portions of section 46(b), “certif[ied] that there is an
emergency requiring some cases and controversies before this
Court to be heard and determined by three-judge panels
consisting of fewer than two judges of this Court.”75 The Order
was to “remain in effect until [Chief Judge Carnes] or another
judge duly authorized to act as Chief Judge formally declare[d]
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that a 28 U.S.C. § 46(b) emergency no longer exists.”76
Although General Order 41 did not specify the nature of the
emergency, Chief Judge Carnes gave an interview shortly after it
was issued, confirming that the emergency arose from the
court’s four vacancies and heavy caseload.77
Shortly after General Order 41 was issued, emergency
panels began presiding over oral arguments in non-capital cases
scheduled for oral argument. While such cases account for only
approximately ten percent of the court’s cases,78 they are often
the most difficult; hence their placement on the oral argument
calendar. As of February 26, 2015, emergency panels had
resolved 113 Eleventh Circuit appeals. The composition of the
emergency panels varied, and included the following
combinations: one active Eleventh Circuit judge and two incircuit district judges;79 one active Eleventh Circuit judge and
two out-of-circuit district judges;80 one senior Eleventh Circuit
judge and two in-circuit district judges;81 one active Eleventh
Circuit judge, one in-circuit district judge, and one out-of-circuit
district judge;82 one active Eleventh Circuit judge, one out-of-
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76. Id. at 1–2.
77. Alyson M. Palmer, Expect to See More Visiting Judges at 11th Circuit: Vacancies
Lead Chief Judge to Temporarily Allow More Than One Visiting Judge Per Panel, DAILY
REP., Jan. 13, 2014, at 1. Chief Judge Carnes opined in the interview that section 46(b)’s
majority requirement was “a rule for a good reason,” but explained that he could not “ask
our active judges [to do] any more. We’re all just so darn busy.” Id. Addressing the
implications of General Order 41 in an interview with the same reporter, Judge Birch
commented that “in his experience visiting judges do not defer on legal matters to the
Eleventh Circuit judges with which they sit,” but that “it’s possible [that] having panels
with two visiting judges will cause the court to take up a few more cases as a whole court
sitting en banc,” since the Eleventh Circuit judges may be “more attuned to looking at
panel opinions where there’s only one circuit judge on there.” Id. Addressing a related
matter in the same interview, Chief Judge Carnes recounted how the court had “resisted
increasing the size of the court” to avoid “dilut[ing] the court’s collegiality or prestige or
mak[ing] it more difficult to preserve the stability and cohesiveness of the court’s
precedent.” Id. The latter concerns would presumably also arise by using more visiting
judges.
78. In the twelve-month period ending September 30, 2013, 11.3 percent of the appeals
terminated on the merits in the Eleventh Circuit received oral argument. Administrative
Office of the United States Courts, Table S-1, U.S. Court of Appeals—Appeals Terminated
on the Merits After Oral Hearings or Submission on the Briefs (2013).
79. E.g., United States v. Charlton, 559 F. App’x 845 (11th Cir. Mar. 14, 2014).
80. E.g., Travelers Prop. Cas. Co. of Am. v. Moore, 763 F.3d 1265 (11th Cir. 2014).
81. E.g., Metcalfe v. Postmaster Gen., 556 F. App’x 909 (11th Cir. Mar. 3, 2014).
82. E.g., United States v. Kaba, 568 F. App’x 882 (11th Cir. June 16, 2014).
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circuit circuit judge, and one in-circuit district judge;83 one
active Eleventh Circuit judge, one judge of the United States
Court of International Trade, and one in-circuit district judge;84
and one active Eleventh Circuit judge, one judge of the United
States Court of International Trade, and one out-of-circuit
district judge.85
Of the 113 opinions issued under General Order 41 thus
far,86 fifty have been precedential and sixty-three have been nonprecedential.87 Visiting trial judges (both district judges and
judges from the Court of International Trade) have played a
crucial role on these emergency panels. Panels that included two
visiting trial judges have heard forty-two of the fifty
precedential opinions and fifty-one of the sixty-three nonprecedential opinions.88 At least one trial judge has participated
in the remaining cases.89 Moreover, of the fifty precedential
opinions issued under General Order 41, twenty-four have been
authored by visiting judges, twenty of those by trial judges.90
Not only have visiting trial judges authored precedential91 (and
non-precedential92) majority opinions, but they have done so
over dissents,93 and they themselves have written separately.94
Visiting circuit judges have likewise authored precedential and
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83. E.g., United States v. Peluffo, 558 F. App’x 853 (11th Cir. Mar. 5, 2014).
84. E.g., Caldwell v. Warden, FCI Talladega, 748 F.3d 1090 (11th Cir. 2014).
85. E.g., Crawford v. LVNV Funding, LLC, 758 F.3d 1254 (11th Cir. 2014).
86. It is possible that some other decisions will be issued by General Order 41 panels,
as there may at the time of this writing still be cases in which oral arguments have been
held before Order 41 panels, but opinions have not yet been issued. See infra n.162 and
accompanying text.
87. Andrew L. Adler, Emergency Panels in the Eleventh Circuit after December 30,
2013 (Sept. 12, 2014; updated Feb. 26, 2015) (unpublished compendium on file with
author) (containing information on cases compiled by searching “sitting by designation”
and the relevant time period in the Eleventh Circuit database on WestLaw).
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. E.g., In re Scantling, 754 F.3d 1323, 1325 n.** (11th Cir. 2014) (characterizing
Judge Schlesinger as sitting by designation).
92. E.g., United States v. Vinales, 565 F. App’x 518 (11th Cir. 2014).
93. E.g., West v. Davis, 767 F.3d 1063, 1065 (11th Cir. Sept. 8, 2014) (Bartle, J.); id. at
1073 (Benavides, J., dissenting in part).
94. E.g., Wetherington v. AmeriPath, Inc., 566 F. App’x 850, 852 *2 (11th Cir. 2014)
(Ungaro, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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dissenting opinions of their own.95 In short, visiting judges,
particularly trial judges, had a noticeable impact on the Circuit’s
precedent in 2014.
C. Rodriguez on Rehearing
Rodriguez was decided by an emergency panel composed
of a senior Eleventh Circuit judge and two visiting in-circuit
district judges, and it rejected Rodriguez’s appeal in a short
unpublished opinion.96 Rodriguez filed a petition for rehearing,
challenging, inter alia, General Order 41 and the validity of the
emergency panel’s composition.97
Observing that the issue appeared to be one of first
impression,98 Rodriguez made the following arguments:
General Order 41 impermissibly failed to identify
the nature of the emergency, thereby precluding
effective review.99

x

Section 46(b)’s emergency exception might modify
the requirement that there be three judges on a panel
rather than the requirement that a majority of the
judges on a panel be “judges of that court.”100

x

Section 46(b)’s emergency exception applies only
to “uncontrollable event[s] affecting a discrete set
of circumstances,” a specific judge, or a particular
category of cases, because the statutory example of
illness refers to an “unexpected, temporary, and

05/20/2015 10:47:31

95. E.g., West, 767 F.3d at 1073 (Benavides, J., dissenting in part); Osorio v. State
Farm Bank, F.S.B., 746 F.3d 1242, 1246 n.* (11th Cir. 2014) (indicating that Judge
Gilman, who wrote for the court in Osorio, is a senior Sixth Circuit judge).
96. Rodriguez, 557 F. App’x 930.
97. Rodriguez Petition, supra note 2.
98. Id. at 10–11 (asserting that “[t]he statute is capable of more than one reading, and it
is possible that the emergency provision of [the] statute is meant to apply only to the threejudge requirement,” and taking the position that, “[b]ecause this is an issue of first
impression in this Court, it should be addressed by the Court”), 14 (asserting that “it is at
least subject to serious question whether an emergency within the meaning of § 46(b)
exists,” and characterizing that question as an additional “first impression issue”).
99. Id. at 12–13.
100. Id. at 10–11.
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dramatic event . . . meeting the ordinary
understanding of the term ‘emergency.’”101
Rather than summarily denying Rodriguez’s petition, the
emergency panel addressed the issue in a four-page precedential
opinion.102
1. An Unaddressed Threshold Issue

05/20/2015 10:47:31

101. Id. at 11–13. Giving effect to an indefinite suspension would be particularly
inappropriate, Rodriguez argued, when the asserted emergency “relates to a perception that
Congress has intentionally or otherwise acted so as not to replace retiring judges,” because
this would “intrude on the Congressional authority to determine the membership needs of a
particular court.” Id. at 11.
102. United States v. Rodriguez, 753 F.3d 1206 (11th Cir. 2014) (per curiam).
103. 140 F.3d at 458–59 (pointing out that “[s]ection 46(d) embodies no requirement
that the quorum contain a majority of judges who are members of the court; it requires only
that it be a majority of a legally authorized panel”).
104. Id. at 458.
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As an initial matter, it is procedurally interesting that
Rodriguez filed his petition for rehearing with the panel he
claimed to have been invalid, and the panel accepted the
invitation to adjudicate its own validity. Although the Rodriguez
situation has apparently never been considered by another court,
a decision by an emergency panel upholding its own validity
may not seem to possess the hallmarks of neutrality.
The Second Circuit’s decision in Desimone, for example, is
instructive on this point. There, the court denied a petition for
rehearing that challenged the validity of a two-judge panel
composed of one Second Circuit judge and one visiting judge
when the third judge, a Second Circuit judge, died after oral
argument.103 However, the Chief Judge designated himself to the
panel to resolve the rehearing petition (and authored the
resulting opinion) after one of the two quorum judges opined
that it “would not be appropriate for a two-judge panel with only
one member of this court to resolve this particular claim.”104
Moreover, the Rodriguez panel, consisting of a senior
Eleventh Circuit judge and two visiting judges, could have even
questioned whether it had the authority to invalidate—or even to
consider invalidating—General Order 41, an order entered “for
the Court” by the Chief Judge. Conversely, had the panel found

36524-aap_15-2 Sheet No. 21 Side B

05/20/2015 10:47:31

ADLERRESEND2.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

182

5/19/2015 12:02 PM

THE JOURNAL OF APPELLATE PRACTICE AND PROCESS

itself to have been invalidly constituted, such a finding would
have raised the circuitous issue of whether that decision would
itself have been valid. That quandary would have been far from
academic, because such a decision would have threatened the
legitimacy of all emergency panels authorized by General Order
41, and would thus have had a significant administrative impact.
These concerns might have been mitigated had the full
court resolved Rodriguez’s challenge. To be fair, his petition
was addressed only to the original panel, and en banc review
would have required substantial judicial resources that were
particularly scarce at the time.105 But General Order 41 was
issued by the chief judge on behalf of the court, and thus the full
court was best suited to adjudicate its validity. And a decision
declaring it invalid would have had circuit-wide implications,
both with regard to appeals already adjudicated by emergency
panels and with regard to the prospective use of such panels. In
this respect, the situation can be analogized to other issues of
circuit-wide administration that the Eleventh Circuit has
considered en banc in the past, including whether its own senior
circuit judges are “judges of that court” for purposes of section
46(b)’s majority requirement,106 whether a recess appointment
confers full authority to act as a federal judge,107 and whether
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105. Although it would have been unusual for the full court to have reheard the case on
its own motion, it might have done so if its members had been made aware of the grounds
for Rodriguez’s motion. See 11th Cir. R. 35, I.O.P. 6 (“Any active Eleventh Circuit judge
may request that the court be polled on whether rehearing en banc should be granted
whether or not a petition for rehearing en banc has been filed by a party.”). Despite various
revisions to the Eleventh Circuit’s rules over the past few years, this version of the Rule 35
IOP was in effect during the spring and summer of 2014, when Rodriguez’s motion for
rehearing was filed and the Eleventh Circuit’s decision on rehearing came down. See, e.g.,
United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, Rules & Procedures, Previous
Revisions to 11th Circuit Rules and IOP (12 Months), http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/rules/
previous-revisions (accessed Feb. 10, 2015; copies of relevant pages on file with Journal of
Appellate Practice and Process).
106. Cone Corp., 995 F.2d at 185–86 (holding that senior judges are among the “judges
of that court” referred to in §46(b)). Two years earlier, the court, in General Order Number
11, had suspended one of its local rules requiring that two active Eleventh Circuit judges sit
on every panel; instead, the Order required that two Eleventh Circuit judges sit on every
panel, but that only one of those judges had to be an active judge. United States Court of
Appeals, Eleventh Circuit, General Order No. 11 (Apr. 30, 1991). A copy of General Order
11 is available at http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/courtdocs/clk/General
Order11.pdf.
107. Evans v. Stephens, 387 F.3d 1220 (11th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (upholding Judge
William H. Pryor’s recess appointment to the court). Evans presented a somewhat
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the decisions of the former Fifth Circuit should be adopted as
binding precedent.108 As in those cases, an en banc resolution in
Rodriguez would have resoundingly settled the issue.
2. The Opinion
The Rodriguez panel deserves praise for explicitly
recognizing the importance of the issue raised by the petition
and for publishing its opinion.109 Indeed, in denying the petition,
the panel began by observing that, although its underlying
decision was unpublished, the validity of the panel’s
composition was an issue of such significance that the opinion
on rehearing “warrant[ed] publication.”110 Furthermore, the
court noted that Rodriguez had waived the issue by failing to
raise it earlier, as the composition of the panel was revealed two
weeks before oral argument.111 “However,” the court continued,
“the significance of the issue for the effective operation of the
judicial functions of this court prompts us to nevertheless
address the issue in an alternative holding.”112 The easiest course
of action would have been to issue the customary summary
denial, particularly given the court’s finding that Rodriguez had

36524-aap_15-2 Sheet No. 22 Side A
05/20/2015 10:47:31

analogous dilemma in that members of the court disagreed about whether it was
appropriate for them to adjudicate the constitutionality of their own colleague’s
appointment. The majority found no impediment and noted that no recusal request had
been lodged. See id. at 1228 n.14. One dissenting judge, however, believed it was “nearly
anathema for circuit court judges to review a colleague’s legitimacy to sit as a member of
their court,” and that doing so would call into question the court’s impartiality and thus
“imperil[ ] public confidence in the Court.” Id. at 1239–40 (Wilson, J., dissenting).
108. Bonner v. City of Pritchard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc).
Readers interested in a more detailed consideration of this issue may consult Andrew L.
Adler, Benefitting from Bonner: The Enduring Significance of Former Fifth Circuit
Decisions in Eleventh Circuit Jurisprudence, RECORD: J. OF FLA. BAR APP. PRAC.
SECTION 1 (Summer 2012).
109. Cf. Murray, 35 F.3d 45. Denying a petition for rehearing in Murray, a panel of two
Second Circuit judges held itself to be a quorum authorized to resolve the underlying
appeal when the third judge recused himself shortly before the oral argument. Id. at 46–47.
Although the two-judge quorum found it appropriate to resolve the petition without adding
a third judge, id. at 48, they acknowledged that the petition “raise[d] an institutional issue
of court procedure that merit[ed] a brief opinion,” id. at 46, and “[b]ecause this opinion
concerns, in part, an administrative matter,” announced that “the opinion ha[d] been
circulated to all of the active judges of this Court prior to filing,” id. at 48 n.1.
110. Rodriguez, 753 F.3d at 1206.
111. Id. at n.1.
112. Id.
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waived the issue. But had the panel opted for that course, the
emergency underlying General Order 41 would have remained
officially unexplained, the statutory issues would have gone
unexplored, and Rodriguez’s ability to seek Supreme Court
review would have therefore been effectively curtailed.113
The panel’s core statutory analysis was contained in three
short paragraphs. After referencing General Order 41 and
quoting section 46(b), the court first confirmed that the certified
emergency did indeed arise from the court’s vacancies and
heavy caseload. The court, taking judicial notice, explained that
“[i]t was a well-known and indisputable fact” that only eight of
its authorized twelve judgeships were occupied both at the time
of General Order 41 and at the time of oral argument, that “the
Circuit has experienced several vacancies for an extended time,
and that, even with a full complement of the Circuit’s authorized
judges, the Circuit has a heavy case load per-judge.”114
Rather than detail the vacancies or the heavy per-judge
caseload, the court instead began a new paragraph by “hold[ing]
that Chief Judge’s General Order No. 41 declares an emergency
clearly contemplated by Congress in § 46(b).”115 The court
emphasized that “[t]he statute contemplate[d] the possibility of
such an emergency even in the event of an extended illness of a
single judge.”116 Although the word “extended” is not contained
in section 46(b), the court opined that “the illness example must
refer to an extended illness, because a sudden, temporary illness
of a judge after originally [being] designated to serve on a
36524-aap_15-2 Sheet No. 22 Side B
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113. Cf. Richard M. Re, Should Lower Courts Facilitate Supreme Court Review? Re’s
Judicata (Oct. 16, 2014, 3:31PM), http://richardresjudicata.wordpress.com/2014/10/16/
should-lower-courts-facilitate-supreme-court-review/ (considering whether there is a duty
to facilitate such review) (accessed Feb. 10, 2015; copy on file with Journal of Appellate
Practice and Process). Following the denial of rehearing, Rodriguez unsuccessfully sought
certiorari, in which he largely reiterated the arguments from his rehearing petition. Pet. for
Writ of Certiorari, Rodriguez v. United States, No. 14-288, 2014 WL 4477706 (Aug. 27,
2014); see 135 S. Ct. 390 (2014) (denying certiorari). While the denial of certiorari in
Rodriguez is unsurprising given the absence of a circuit split, the Supreme Court has
periodically reviewed challenges to the composition of lower courts. See, e.g., Samuel P.
Jordan, Irregular Panels, 60 ALA. L. REV. 547, 553–56 (2009) (summarizing such
Supreme Court cases).
114. Rodriguez, 753 F.3d at 1207.
115. Id.
116. Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 46(b)).
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particular panel is otherwise provided for in § 46(d),”117 which
provides that “[a] majority of the number of judges authorized to
constitute . . . a panel . . . shall constitute a quorum.”118
Therefore, the court reasoned, “[i]t follows a fortiori that the
extended shortage of judges caused by the vacancies here,
together with the heavy per-judge caseload of this Circuit,
qualifies as an emergency contemplated by Congress.”119
The court then “readily reject[ed]” Rodriguez’s argument
that the two “unless” clauses of the statute modified the
requirement that there be three judges instead of the requirement
that a majority of those judges be judges “of that court.”120
Rather, the court held
that the two “unless” clauses modify, and provide an
exception from, the more immediate of the two preceding
phrases. That is, we hold that the two “unless” clauses
provide an exception to the requirement that a majority of
121
the three judges on the panel be judges of that court.

For support, the court cited a footnote in a Second Circuit
decision indicating that the two exceptions “probably modify”
the majority requirement.122 The court left open the possibility
that—but declined to address whether—the exceptions also
modified the requirement that there be three judges on a
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117. Id. at 1207 n.3.
118. 28 U.S.C. § 46(d).
119. Rodriguez, 753 F.3d at 1207.
120. Id. at 1207 n.4.
121. Id.
122. Id. (citing Whitehall Tenants Corp. v. Whitehall Realty Co., 136 F.3d 230 (2d Cir.
1998)). In Whitehall, the Second Circuit denied a petition for rehearing that challenged the
validity of a decision rendered by a quorum of two in-circuit judges when the third incircuit judge on the panel recused after participating in oral argument, and one of the other
judges listened to a recording of the argument instead of attending in person. 136 F.2d at
231–33. Although the “unless clauses” in § 46(b) were only “arguably relevant” to the
matters at issue there, the Whitehall court considered whether they modified the
requirement that there be three judges on a panel or the requirement that a majority of the
panel’s judges be members of the court hearing the case. Id. at 232 n.3. While the
Whitehall court found the issue to be “unclear,” it stated that “[t]he structure and
juxtaposition of the two ‘unless’ clauses suggest that they are exceptions to the same
requirement,” and concluded that they “probably modify” the majority requirement. Id.
The Whitehall court hypothesized that, if the “unless” clauses modified the “requirement
that a panel consist of three judges, the requirement that two of the judges must be
members ‘of that court’ would be a parenthetical aside.” Id.
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panel.123 Observing that there was “very little precedent bearing
on this issue,”124 the Rodriguez court also cited the Fifth
Circuit’s 1991 and 1999 emergency-certification orders as
supporting authority,125 noting as to each the number of
vacancies and the heavy caseload that the Fifth Circuit used to
justify its certifications of emergency conditions.126
IV. THE UNCERTAIN SCOPE
OF SECTION 46(B)’S EMERGENCY EXCEPTION
A. What Do the Statutory Exceptions Mean?

05/20/2015 10:47:31

123. Rodriguez, 753 F.3d at 1207 n.4.
124. Id. at 1207.
125. Id. at 1207–08.
126. Id. Perhaps because its opinion had already referred to conditions in the Eleventh
Circuit, see supra note 114 and accompanying text, the Rodriguez court did not explicitly
compare the emergency conditions that prompted the Fifth Circuit’s certifications to the
conditions then existing in the Eleventh Circuit. It did, however, refer again to Whitehall,
which itself cited the Fifth Circuit’s 1991 order. Id. at 1208 (citing Whitehall, 136 F.3d at
232 n.3).
127. See, e.g., Rodriguez Petition, supra note 2, at 10–11 (11th Cir. Mar. 25, 2014).
128. Rodriguez, 753 F.3d at 1207 n.4.
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Before addressing the scope of the emergency exception, it
is first necessary to address the threshold argument that
section 46(b)’s “unless” clauses are exceptions to the
requirement that panels consist of three judges, not the
requirement that a majority of those judges be judges “of that
court.”127 If so, then visiting judges could presumably never
form the majority of a validly constituted panel, because there
would be no exceptions to the majority requirement. The
Rodriguez court “readily reject[ed]” that argument, relying on
Whitehall.128
That appears to be the better view. As a textual matter, the
exceptions could grammatically modify both the three-judge
requirement and the majority requirement, or the majority
requirement alone, but they could not modify only the threejudge requirement. The exceptions follow immediately from the
majority requirement, and it is therefore difficult to read the
exceptions as modifying only the three-judge requirement.
Supporting that interpretation is the 1982 Senate Report, which
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discusses section 46(b)’s two exceptions in connection with the
majority requirement but not the three-judge requirement.129
Furthermore, the Report states that, while two judges may
constitute a quorum if the third judge becomes unavailable, “in
the first instance, all cases would be assigned to a panel of at
least three judges.”130 In that case, the exceptions could apply to
the three-judgment requirement only after a panel was
constituted, which would seem to be an arbitrary temporal
limitation. Nonetheless, the text and purpose of the statute do
not exclude the possibility that the exceptions could modify the
three-judgment requirement in addition to the majority
requirement, but that issue is unclear and ultimately need not be
resolved here.
Given that the emergency exception modifies at least the
majority requirement, the central statutory issue—whether
judicial vacancies, coupled with a heavy caseload, can trigger
the emergency exception—must be addressed. While, as
explained above, several circuits have resolved that issue
affirmatively, their conclusion is far from the single clear
choice. To foster some doubt, one need only consider that, when
Congress revised section 46(b) in 1982 to include both the
majority requirement and the exceptions, extended judicial
vacancies were nowhere near as prevalent as they are today,131
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129. 1982 Senate Report, supra note 29, at 26–27, reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 11,
36–37.
130. Id. at 9, reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 19 (emphasis added); see Nguyen, 539
U.S. at 82 (“[T]he statutory authority for courts of appeals to sit in panels, 28 U.S.C. §
46(b), requires the inclusion of at least three judges in the first instance.”); Jordan, supra
note 113, at 549 (“[T]he prevailing approach to panel formation and composition seems to
be as follows. All appeals must be assigned in the first instance to a panel of three
authorized judges. If an assigned judge becomes unavailable, the panel may decide with
only two judges, subject to local rules that restrict the statutory authority to do so.”).
131. See, e.g., Barry J. McMillion, President Obama’s First-Term U.S. Circuit and
District Court Nominations: An Analysis and Comparison with Presidents Since Reagan, at
Summary (Cong. Res. Serv. May 2, 2013) (“The average number of days elapsed from
nomination to confirmation for circuit court nominees confirmed during a President’s first
term ranged from 45.5 during President Reagan’s first term to 277 days during President
G.W. Bush’s. . . . The median number of days from nomination to confirmation for circuit
court nominees confirmed during a President’s first term ranged from 28 days (Reagan) to
225.5 days (Obama).”); Barry J. McMillion, Length of Time from Nomination to
Confirmation for “Uncontroversial” U.S. Circuit and District Nominees: Detailed
Analysis, at Summary (Cong. Res. Serv. Sept. 18, 2012) (“For uncontroversial circuit court
nominees, the mean and median number of days from nomination to confirmation ranged
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and the caseload crisis facing the federal courts of appeals was
only beginning to develop.132 Thus, as a practical matter, it
would seem unlikely that Congress had in mind extended
vacancies, coupled with a heavy per-judge caseload, as a form of
emergency when it revised section 46(b) in 1982.
Rather than acknowledging the dramatically different state
of the federal judiciary during the era of section 46(b)’s
amendment, both Rodriguez and the emergency panel instead
sought to build their analyses around the one statutory example
of emergency—“including, but not limited to, the unavailability
of a judge of the court because of illness.”133 The panel’s
analysis consisted of two components:
x

The illness exemplified in the statute referred to an
extended illness, not a sudden, temporary illness;
and

x

If the extended illness of a single judge constituted
an emergency, then so too must the extended
shortage of judges due to vacancies, coupled with
the court’s heavy per-judge caseload.134

05/20/2015 10:47:31

from a low of 64.5 and 44.0 days, respectively, during the Reagan presidency to a high of
227.3 and 218.0 days, respectively, during the Obama presidency.”).
132. See supra notes 4–6 and accompanying text.
133. 28 U.S.C. § 46(b).
134. Rodriguez, 753 F.3d at 1207 & 1207 n.3.
135. Id. at 1207 n. 3.
136. 28 U.S.C. § 46(d).
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As for the first component, the Rodriguez court opined that
the exemplified illness must be an extended illness, because “a
sudden, temporary illness of a judge after originally designated
to serve on a particular panel is otherwise provided for in
§ 46(d),”135 which authorizes a quorum of two judges in the
event the third judge becomes unavailable.136 This interpretation
is persuasive, though it is not the only possible reading. As one
commentator has pointed out, Congress may have instead
contemplated a sudden, temporary illness in order to immunize a
two-judge quorum with one visiting judge from violating section
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46(b)’s majority requirement.137 Lending some credence to that
view, the Third Circuit has previously certified an emergency
under such circumstances (though in the case of death rather
than illness).138 On the other hand, the Second Circuit would not
require a certificate of emergency in that situation, because it
analyzes compliance with section 46(b)’s majority requirement
at the time of panel formation, not at the time of decision.139 If
that view were adopted, then the Rodriguez panel would appear
to be correct in determining that the illness must refer to an
extended illness, because, in that case, the exception would be
unnecessary to ensure compliance by a two-judge quorum with
one visiting judge following the sudden illness of the third judge
on the panel.
Potentially more problematic, however, is the second
component of the panel’s reasoning—that if the extended
unavailability of a single ill judge could constitute an
emergency, then so too must multiple extended vacancies
coupled with a heavy caseload.140 The difficulty is that the
unavailability exemplified in the statute arose “because of
illness,” indicating that the reason for the unavailability qualifies
the scope of the exception; and vacancies may be qualitatively
different from illnesses (and, for that matter, recusals and
disqualifications). As Rodriguez argued in his petition, an
illness, like a recusal or disqualification, represents an
“unexpected, temporary, and dramatic event,” whereas extended
vacancies arise from the political branches’ inability or
36524-aap_15-2 Sheet No. 25 Side A
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137. Will Baude, Is the Eleventh Circuit in an “Emergency” State? WASHINGTON POST,
Volokh Conspiracy (June 12, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokhconspiracy/wp/ 2014/06/12/is-the-eleventh-circuit-in-an-emergency-state/ (concluding that
“the exception to 46(b) is needed even in the case of ‘a sudden temporary illness’”)
(accessed Feb. 10, 2015; copy on file with Journal of Appellate Practice and Process).
138. United States v. Thompson, 70 F.3d 279, 280 n.** (3d Cir. 1995) (referring to
certification of a section 46(b) emergency to allow a Third Circuit judge and a visiting
district judge to resolve an appeal as a quorum after the death of the second Third Circuit
judge originally on the panel).
139. Desimone, 140 F.3d at 458–59.
140. See Rodriguez, 753 F.3d at 1207 (“The statute contemplates the possibility of such
emergency even in the event of an extended illness of a single judge. . . . It follows a
fortiori that the extended shortage of judges caused by the vacancies here, together with the
heavy per judge caseload of this Circuit, qualifies as an emergency contemplated by
Congress.”) (internal citation and footnote omitted).
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141. Rodriguez Petition, supra note 2, at 11–14.
142. Baude, supra note 137 (“A branch of Congress is in charge of confirming judicial
nominees, [and] I doubt that the President and the Senate’s joint decision not to appoint a
judge is an emergency in the sense Congress meant. Rather, I would have thought that an
emergency is something outside of the hands of Congress and the President—whether
because of timing or circumstances.”).
143. 28 U.S.C. § 46(b).
144. 1982 Senate Report, supra note 29, at 27, reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 11, 37.
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unwillingness to fill vacant seats.141 One commentator has
similarly questioned whether Congress meant to include as the
source of an emergency the inaction of one of its own branches,
in addition to external factors beyond its control.142 Because
Congress itself, through the Senate, helps fill vacancies by
confirming nominees, extended vacancies are in a sense selfimposed, provided that the President has made nominations.
Complicating matters further, the recusal/disqualification
exception applies only when “such judges [i.e., a majority from
the presiding court] cannot sit.”143 This language—“cannot
sit”—suggests something like an impossibility standard. If so,
the question arises whether it governs only the
recusal/disqualification exception or both exceptions. The
absence of this language from the emergency exception would
appear to suggest the former under the canon of expressio unius
est exclusio alterius. Moreover, it is unclear how “the
unavailability of a [single] judge because of illness” could ever
make it impossible to empanel a majority of judges of the
presiding court. The unavailability of a single circuit judge
might delay the formation of a section 46(b)-compliant panel,
but its formation would only be truly impossible if there were a
total of two judges on the circuit, which does not describe any
federal court of appeals. By contrast, the recusal/disqualification
exception does not speak in terms of a single judge.
However, it is not readily apparent why the
recusal/disqualification exception would apply only when it was
impossible to comply with the majority requirement, while the
emergency exception would be governed by some lesser
standard. In this regard, the 1982 Senate Report, referring
generally to both exceptions, rather than just the
recusal/disqualification exception, states that they apply “when
it is impossible to constitute a panel of a court of appeals
composed of a majority of judges of that court.”144 As an
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example, the Report refers to the situation in which an entire
court was recused or disqualified;145 while this situation would
fall under the first exception, the Report’s discussion does not
state that the impossibility standard would apply only to that
exception.146
A Ninth Circuit panel, however, has suggested that
necessity, not impossibility, is the applicable standard for the
emergency exception.147 Hearing a post-conviction motion in a
procedurally complicated case in which the defendant was
himself a federal judge, that panel rejected the argument that the
panel assigned to the direct appeal148 violated section 46(b)’s
majority requirement.149 The court reasoned that “the chief
judge retains a great deal of discretion in deciding when out-ofcircuit judges are needed,” and concluded that he “effectively
certified an emergency for the purposes of section 46(b) when
he certified a necessity under § 291(a).”150 Under this reading, a
circuit’s chief judge has broad discretion to invoke the
emergency exception whenever he or she determines there to be
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145. See, e.g., United States v. Moody, 977 F.2d 1420, 1423 (11th Cir. 1992) (decision
rendered by three visiting judges after “all judges of this court entered an order recusing
themselves ‘from participating in this case and in any other cases relating to the
investigation of the murder of the Honorable Robert S. Vance,’” an Eleventh Circuit
judge).
146. 1982 Senate Report, supra note 29, at 27, reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 11, 37.
147. United States v. Claiborne, 870 F.2d 1463 (9th Cir. 1989).
148. The panel at issue in Claiborne consisted of three out-of-circuit circuit judges
seated after the chief judge submitted a “certificate of necessity” to the Chief Justice. See
28 U.S.C. § 291(a). Congress amended § 291(a) after Claiborne, and a certificate of
necessity is no longer required to designate an out-of-circuit judge; rather, the circuit’s
chief judge or the circuit justice need only make a request, and the Chief Justice need only
find the designation to be “in the public interest.” Federal Courts Administration Act of
1992, Pub. L. No. 102-572, tit. I, § 104, 106 Stat. 4506. Congress amended this provision
in order to “allow[ ] judges of the courts of appeals a regular opportunity to sit on other
courts of appeals from time to time, on an exchange basis, as a means of promoting
education in court administration.” S. Rep. No. 102-342, at 27 (1992) (“Such a program
would represent a cost-effective means of familiarizing judges of the courts of appeals with
management and administrative techniques that appear to work effectively in other courts,
and thus allow them to consider those techniques for adaption and possible adoption in
their own courts.”); see Levy, supra note 4, at 383–85 (discussing the use of visiting judges
as a means of “information sharing”). A certificate of necessity remains required before the
Chief Justice may designate an out-of-circuit district judge to serve on a court of appeals.
28 U.S.C. § 292(d).
149. Claiborne, 870 F.2d at 1466 n.2; see also id. at 1464–67 (discussing appellants’
interrelated statutory claims).
150. Claiborne, 870 F.2d at 1466.
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a “need” for visiting judges. Federal courts of appeals would
seemingly have little difficulty meeting that standard when
confronted with multiple vacancies and a heavy per-judge
caseload.151
Nonetheless, there is reason to question Claiborne’s
equation of section 291(a)’s certificate of necessity with section
46(b)’s certificate of emergency. Necessity and emergency are
distinct concepts,152 and it should be assumed that Congress
deliberately required different certificates for different
situations.153 And the threshold to designate an out-of-circuit
judge (“necessity”) would appropriately appear to be less
stringent than the threshold to designate multiple visiting judges
and dispense with section 46(b)’s majority requirement
(“emergency”). Thus, section 46(b)’s emergency exception
arguably requires something more than necessity.
Supporting that argument, the 1982 Senate Report
generally describes both section 46(b) exceptions as “the most
unusual circumstances”154 or “exigent circumstances.”155 While
it gives no indication about what circumstances aside from
illness would constitute or give rise to an emergency, these
descriptors arguably indicate that section 46(b)’s exceptions
were intended to be narrow in scope. Nonetheless, one might
argue that the 1982 Congress would consider the extended
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151. The certificate of necessity appears to be a standardized form that does not require
an explanation of the necessity. See Nicholle Stahl-Reisdorff, The Use of Visiting Judges in
the Federal District Courts 49 (Fed. Judicial Ctr. 2001 update 2006) (including sample
certificate of necessity).
152. See, e.g., BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 636, 1193 (Bryan A. Garner ed., 10th ed.
2014) (defining “emergency” as either “[a] sudden and serious event or an unforeseen
change in circumstances that calls for immediate action to avert, control, or remedy harm”
or “[a]n urgent need for relief or help”; and defining “necessity” in several ways, including
as “[s]omething that must be done or accomplished for any one of various reasons, ranging
from the continuation of life itself to a legal requirement of some kind to an intense
personal desire” or “[p]hysical or moral compulsion; the pressure of circumstance,” and
noting further that “[c]ontext normally supplies a sense of the degree of urgency,” while
recognizing that necessity may supply “a defense for a person who acts in an emergency”).
153. See, e.g., Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137, 146 (1995) (“We assume that
Congress used two terms because it intended each term to have a particular,
nonsuperfluous meaning.”); cf. Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., Inc., 534 U.S. 438, 461–62
(2002) (recognizing longstanding rule that “courts must presume that a legislature says in a
statute what it means and means in a statute what it says there”) (internal citations and
quotation marks omitted).
154. 1982 Senate Report, supra note 29, at 26, reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 11, 36.
155. Id. at 9, reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 19.
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vacancies and crushing caseloads of today to be “most unusual”
and “exigent.” Moreover, the statutory example of a single
judge’s illness arguably broadens the word “emergency” beyond
its everyday connotation. Without that example, one might not
otherwise be inclined to consider an increased per-judge
caseload (due to extended vacancies) as rising to the level of an
emergency, particularly if the court declines to request
additional judgeships or modify its case-management
techniques.
B. When Does an Emergency Arise?
And When Does It End?
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156. See, e.g., Patrick J. Leahy, Chairman, Sen. Judiciary Comm., Press Release,
Statement on Judicial Nominations, http://www.leahy.senate.gov/press/statement-of-senator
-patrick-leahy-d-vt-chairman-senate-judiciary-committee-on-judicial-nominations13 (July 31,
2014) (“Since the beginning of this year, we have reduced the vacancies on our Federal
courts by over a third, from 92 to 57, and reduced the number of judicial emergency
vacancies by nearly half, from 37 to 19.”); John McCain, U.S. Sen., Press Release, Sen.
McCain on Arizona Judicial Nominees, http://www.mccain.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/
press-releases?ID=f43ecf45-c34c-434b-a417-c0c8e3bb07c6 (May 14, 2014) (“Of the 13
authorized judgeships for this court, 6 are currently vacant. This, together with the large
caseload, led the District of Arizona to be declared a ‘judicial emergency’ in 2011.”) (both
accessed Feb. 12, 2015; copies on file with Journal of Appellate Practice and Process).
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Compounding the uncertainty, two questions of degree
arise even assuming that extended vacancies coupled with heavy
caseloads can trigger section 46(b)’s emergency exception. First,
at what point does an emergency arise? Clearly the Eleventh
Circuit was in a perilous situation in late 2013, with four judicial
emergencies, one third of its judgeships vacant, and the heaviest
per-judge caseload of any circuit. But what if a court was to
certify an emergency with, say, only one vacancy and a
comparatively moderate per-judge caseload? What if the court
experienced no vacancies at all but experienced a substantial
increase in filings? While mathematical cutoffs may not be
necessary, the adjusted-filing caseload methodology employed
by the Administrative Office of the United States Courts to
determine judicial emergencies is one that Senators often
invoke,156 and it may also be useful in determining whether a
section 46(b) emergency exists.
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Second, and relatedly, how long should an emergency last?
General Order 41 purported to be of indefinite duration, and
Chief Judge Carnes explained in an interview that “he [didn’t]
have in mind a specific number of active judges the court must
have before he would lift the order,” but that “there would be no
more need for the emergency measure” once “the court actually
had all 12 of its spots filled.”157 Ultimately it did not last that
long. Judge Barkett’s vacant seat was filled in May 2014,158
Judge Edmondson’s vacant seat was filled in July 2014,159 and
Judge Birch’s vacant seat was filled in September 2014.160 The
following month, with one vacancy remaining, Chief Judge
Carnes issued a new general order declaring an end to the
emergency.161 General Order 42 explained that “[t]he
circumstances that led to the issuance of General Order No. 41
have changed enough so that no more panels will be composed
of fewer than two judges of this Court,” but indicated that it
would have an impact only “as far as future panels are
concerned.”162
There are two ways to think about the duration issue. One
might argue that courts should certify an emergency as soon as
the requisite conditions exist and de-certify the emergency as
soon as those same conditions evaporate. That symmetry would
eliminate any confusion about what the requisite conditions
were, and discourage declared emergencies from dragging on
too long.163 At the same time, certifying an emergency is not
36524-aap_15-2 Sheet No. 27 Side B
05/20/2015 10:47:31

157. Palmer, supra note 77, at 1.
158. John Pacenti, Robin Rosenbaum Unanimously Confirmed for Federal Appellate
Court, DAILY BUS. REV., May 12, 2014, at A1.
159. R. Robin McDonald, Senate Confirms Julie Carnes to Eleventh Circuit by 94-0
Vote, DAILY REP., July 21, 2014.
160. R. Robin McDonald, Senate Confirms Jill Pryor to Eleventh Circuit, DAILY REP.,
Sept. 8, 2014.
161. United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit, General Order No. 42 (Oct. 17,
2014) [hereinafter General Order 42]; Alyson M. Palmer, Eleventh Circuit Chief Declares
End to Emergency, DAILY REP., Oct. 21, 2014. A copy of General Order 42 is available at
http://wwwca11.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/courtdocs/clk/GeneralOrder42.pdf (accessed
Feb. 12, 2015; copy on file with Journal of Appellate Practice and Process).
162. General Order 42, supra note 161, at 1. In order to “conserve judicial resources,
avoid inefficiencies, and prevent unnecessary delay,” the Order allowed emergency panels
to resolve and administer any cases that had already been argued or submitted. Id. at 1–2.
163. Cf. Gregory Korte, Special Report: America’s Perpetual State of Emergency, USA
Today (Oct. 23, 2014 9:11 AM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2014/10/22/
president-obama-states-of-emergency/16851775/ (“U.S. presidents have declared 52 states
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necessarily a quantifiable matter of mathematics. Moreover,
courts should have the discretion, and should perhaps be
encouraged, to wait as long as possible, even beyond the onset
of an emergency, before certifying one, with the hope that
conditions will improve and render invocation of section 46(b)
unnecessary. That restraint would limit the exception to true
emergencies and maintain it as a last resort. But, in that case,
courts would not necessarily be required to de-certify an
emergency immediately following an improvement in
conditions. For example, the Eleventh Circuit, given its heavy
per-judge case load (even when all of its judgeships are filled),
may have considered itself to be in a state of emergency after,
say, the second vacancy, but may have exercised restraint by
waiting to certify the emergency until after the fourth vacancy.
That might explain why it declared an end to the emergency
after only three of the four vacancies were filled.
V. CONCLUSION: GOING FORWARD AFTER RODRIGUEZ

05/20/2015 10:47:31

of emergency since Congress passed the National Emergencies Act in 1976. Thirty are still
in effect.”) (accessed Feb. 12, 2015; copy on file with Journal of Appellate Practice and
Process). The longest section 46(b) emergency appears to have occurred in the Fifth
Circuit, which did not declare an end to its 1999 emergency until 2007. Order Vacating
Declaration of a Judicial Emergency Under 28 U.S. Code, Section 46(b), 2007 WL 43971
(Jan. 8, 2007); Order Declaring an Emergency Under 28 U.S.C. § 46(b) (5th Cir. Sept. 28,
1999).
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Various circuits have concluded that judicial vacancies,
coupled with a heavy caseload, can trigger section 46(b)’s
emergency exception to the majority requirement. Although the
statutory issue is debatable, the federal courts of appeals should
not be criticized for reaching that conclusion when confronted
with extended vacancies and crushing caseloads. To the
contrary, by enlisting additional visiting judges, they are
maximizing available resources in order to administer justice
under difficult and trying circumstances. And, in their
estimation, the benefits to designating more visiting judges
outweigh the costs. That judgment, forged in the trenches,
should be afforded deference.
Nonetheless, Congress, not the courts, is ultimately
responsible for regulating the use of visiting judges, and it has

36524-aap_15-2 Sheet No. 28 Side B

05/20/2015 10:47:31

ADLERRESEND1.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

196

5/14/2015 12:26 PM

THE JOURNAL OF APPELLATE PRACTICE AND PROCESS

previously expressed concerns about their use. Congress enacted
section 46(b)’s majority requirement because it believed that
allowing visiting judges to predominate on appellate panels
would have an adverse impact on the stability and predictability
of circuit precedent.164 Others have similarly expressed concern
that visiting judges, even when they do not form a panel
majority, are more likely to destabilize the law of the circuit; and
some have echoed Judge Birch’s concern that opinions by
visiting judges are more likely to result in en banc review.165
The use of district judges in particular has engendered
substantial criticism,166 and they sit by designation the most.167
Some have expressed concern that visiting district judges
“exercise a function that they presumably were not nominated,
confirmed, or appointed to perform,” thereby “ignor[ing] . . .
important distinctions between the trial and appellate functions
and between the kinds of persons who are likely to be best suited
to perform these functions.”168 Some have suggested that
opinions authored by district judges sitting by designation carry
an “unavoidable asterisk.”169 And some have also suggested that
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164. 1982 Senate Report, supra note 29, at 9, 26, reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 11,
19, 36.
165. Benesh, supra note 22, at 305. A recent example: On September 3 and 4, 2014, the
Eleventh Circuit granted rehearing in two cases, each of which was originally decided by a
panel that included a visiting judge. See United States v. Davis, 754 F.3d 1205 (11th Cir.
2014), rehearing en banc granted 573 F. App’x 925 (11th Cir. 2014); United States v. Roy,
761 F.3d 1285 (11th Cir. 2014), rehearing en banc granted 580 F. App’x 715 (11th Cir.
2014). In Davis, a visiting judge authored the panel opinion, 754 F.3d at 1208 n.*
(referring to Judge Sentelle of the D.C. Circuit), and in Roy, a visiting judge cast the
deciding vote, 761 F.3d at 1286, 1298 (indicating that Judge Wilson of the Eleventh Circuit
wrote the panel opinion, that Chief Judge Carnes of the Eleventh Circuit filed a dissent, and
that Judge Dalton of the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida was
the third member of the panel).
166. See, e.g., Benesh, supra note 22, at 302–03, 305–08, 313–14 (summarizing
criticisms).
167. See Budziak, supra note 18, at 22–23 (including table charting use of visiting
judges by type from 1975 to 2010, and noting that “district court judges, both senior and
active, provide more service as visitors than their appellate brethren, with active district
court judges playing the largest role”); see also Brudney & Distlear, supra note 20, at 565–
66 (“[D]esignated trial court visitors have helped decide more than 75,000 court of appeals
cases since 1980.”).
168. Saphire & Solimine, supra note 19, at 358–59.
169. Benesh, supra note 22, at 305 (citation omitted). Indeed, during a recent oral
argument in the United States Supreme Court, former Solicitor General Paul Clement
suggested that opinions written by district judges sitting by designation are entitled to less
weight than those written by circuit judges:
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visiting district judges tend to view themselves as subordinate to
circuit judges, deferring too much and exhibiting a reluctance to
dissent.170
Structurally too, there remains an inherent awkwardness to
judicial mobility, with judges appointed to one court deciding
cases in another. Mobility can also raise representational
concerns. Before Congress authorized visiting judges, there was
an aversion “driven largely by fears of unfamiliar judges
imposing foreign legal interpretations on local communities.”171
Those fears may still have some resonance today for out-ofcircuit visiting judges, who were not screened by senators or
nominating commissions from the circuits they visit, and, in that
sense, may be considered less accountable to, or representative
MR. CLEMENT: Well, a couple of things, Justice Sotomayor. I went back to the
Tropiano case because it is sort of the pro genitor [sic] of this whole line of
Second Circuit cases, and I noticed two things. One, I noticed it was written by a
district judge sitting by designation. So I mean, I—I don’t mean anything by that
other than this is not Marbury. Second, I would say that the second thing I
noticed is that the debt—
JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Oh, I think when I sat as a district court judge, I
would have been insulted by that.
(Laughter).
MR. CLEMENT: Well, it’s not—it’s a good thing you’re no longer sitting in
that capacity, Your Honor—
JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Okay. It’s [sic] really is, for you.
MR. CLEMENT: —because I— I certainly mean you no offense. You could
write Marbury here.

36524-aap_15-2 Sheet No. 29 Side A
05/20/2015 10:47:31

Supreme Court of the United States, Oral Argument Transcripts—October Term 2013, No.
12-357 Sekhar v. United States 61, http://www.supremecourt.gov/search.aspx?Search=12357&type=Site (2013) (accessed Feb. 13, 2015; copies on file with Journal of Appellate
Practice and Process); see also Josh Blackmon, Paul Clement Disses Judges Sitting By
Designation, Sotomayor Shoots Back, Josh Blackman’s Blog (Apr. 23, 2013), http://josh
blackman.com/blog/2013/04/23/paul-clement-disses-judges-sitting-by-designation-sotomay
or-shoots-back/ (Apr. 23, 2013) (quoting Clement/Sotomayor exchange from Sekhar
transcript and noting that, in Blackman’s “clerking experiences, it was not unheard of to
give less weight to an opinion written by a visiting judge. You just weren’t suppose[d] to
acknowledge it . . . to a judge who sat by designation . . . who now sits on the Supreme
Court”) (accessed Feb. 13, 2015; copy on file with Journal of Appellate Practice and
Process).
170. Benesh, supra note 22, at 306–07, 313–14; Brudney & Distlear, supra note 20, at
597–98, 599; see also Saphire & Solimine, supra note 19, at 380 (“One district judge,
dissenting from a Sixth Circuit panel decision, ‘spoke of the temerity required of a district
judge in dissenting from the opinion of an appellate panel on which he sits by
designation.’”) (citation omitted).
171. Budziak, supra note 18, at 11.
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172. Id. at 24.
173. Resolving this debate is beyond the scope of this article. Thus, in summarizing the
concerns about the use of visiting judges, the author does not purport to suggest that they
are ultimately persuasive.
174. See Levy, supra note 14, at 2415–17 (discussing court practices in relation to
visiting judges, and observing that visiting judges are “not widely discussed in the
literature,” and “the reliance on visitors is clearly one promising area for research”);
Budziak, supra note 18, at 4, 162–63 (purporting, in 2011, “to provide the first thorough,
systematic study of the visiting judge process” and suggesting avenues for future research);
Benesh, supra note 22, at 315 (“In short, we (political scientists especially) know woefully
little about these [visiting] judges . . . . It is about time we started paying attention to them
and to their peculiar characteristics that may well affect how they decide cases.”) (footnote
omitted). Of particular relevance for section 46(b) would be a study comparing the impact
of visiting judges in cases in which they formed a panel majority and cases in which they
did not.
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of, the populace subject to their decisions. And, aggravating
those fears, some have speculated that “visiting judges create the
opportunity for appellate judges to pursue policy goals” by
“alter[ing] the[ ] ideological composition of the decision-making
group.”172
Whether these concerns are warranted or exaggerated
remains subject to debate,173 as the impact of visiting judges is
an area ripe for further empirical research.174 But Congress must
continue to evaluate these concerns, as it is charged with
maintaining a delicate balance between difficult competing
considerations. On the one hand, limiting already overburdened
circuits to one visiting judge per panel poses risks to the
administration of appellate justice in the face of vacancyexacerbated caseloads. On the other hand, the liberal use of
visiting judges to form panel majorities poses potential risks to
both circuit precedent and the judiciary as an institution.
The current statutory balance allows for the regular,
periodic use of visiting judges when they do not form a panel
majority, but strictly circumscribes their use beyond that.
Congress may need to revisit that original calibration now that
Rodriguez has solidified the judiciary’s broad interpretation of
section 46(b)’s emergency exception. Or it may not. The federal
courts of appeals have certified emergencies since the early
1990s, and Congress has not seen fit to revise section 46(b) in
response, arguably sending a tacit signal of approval.
Even if Congress takes no action, certifications based on
the vacancy-caseload combination should receive greater
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scrutiny. Dispensing with section 46(b)’s majority requirement
based on the vacancy-caseload combination is gradually, but
quietly, becoming institutionalized. Furthermore, extended
circuit vacancies and heavy caseloads are likely to persist for the
foreseeable future, and the federal courts of appeals can now
rely on Rodriguez as a precedent that withstood legal
challenge.175 Thus, as a practical matter, the federal courts of
appeals are likely to continue certifying section 46(b)
emergencies when they are inevitably confronted with multiple
vacancies and a heavy per-judge caseload. Again, that practice is
unsurprising and defensible. But an emergency procedure should
become normalized only after receiving due discussion.
Not only would such dialogue be healthy for its own sake,
it may even help spur progress. After all, “[t]he judicial vacancy
crisis must end,”176 as must the crisis in volume. Statistics
documenting extended vacancies and the heavy per-judge
caseloads they exacerbate have failed to trigger meaningful
reform thus far. Nor have the controversial case-management
techniques to which the courts have been forced to resort as a
result.177 But perhaps emergency panels, if they continue as
predicted, and if they garner increased attention, may help bring
those crises to their tipping point.
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175. However, the precedential value of Rodriguez may be somewhat diminished given
the emergency panel’s own stake in the issue. See supra § III(C)(1).
176. Tobias, supra note 12, at 6.
177. See supra notes 13–15 and accompanying text.

